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Background: Around the globe, school closures were used sporadically to mitigate the 2009 H1N1 influenza
pandemic. However, such closures can detrimentally impact economic and social life.
Methods: Here, we couple a decision analytic approach with a mathematical model of influenza transmission to
estimate the impact of school closures in terms of epidemiological and cost effectiveness. Our method assumes
that the transmissibility and the severity of the disease are uncertain, and evaluates several closure and reopening
strategies that cover a range of thresholds in school-aged prevalence (SAP) and closure durations.
Results: Assuming a willingness to pay per quality adjusted life-year (QALY) threshold equal to the US per capita
GDP ($46,000), we found that the cost effectiveness of these strategies is highly dependent on the severity and on
a willingness to pay per QALY. For severe pandemics, the preferred strategy couples the earliest closure trigger
(0.5% SAP) with the longest duration closure (24 weeks) considered. For milder pandemics, the preferred strategies
also involve the earliest closure trigger, but are shorter duration (12 weeks for low transmission rates and variable
length for high transmission rates).
Conclusions: These findings highlight the importance of obtaining early estimates of pandemic severity and
provide guidance to public health decision-makers for effectively tailoring school closures strategies in response to
a newly emergent influenza pandemic.Background
Influenza pandemics affect millions of people worldwide,
exacting significant costs on the global economy in terms
of illness, deaths, medical resources, and loss of productiv-
ity. In 2009, the influenza A (H1N1) pandemic challenged
the world’s socio-economic system and forced public
health agencies to take aggressive measures to mitigate its
social and economic impact in some parts of the world. It
demonstrated the importance of non-pharmaceutical
interventions prior to the distribution of an effective vac-
cine [1]. However, during the early emergence of a new in-
fluenza pandemic, estimates of the transmissibility and
severity (i.e. case fatality rate) of the new virus are typically
based on noisy and sparse data [2]. Public health officials
thus face considerable uncertainties when making deci-
sions about early stage pandemic mitigation strategies.* Correspondence: ozgur.araz@unmc.edu
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orSchool closures offer a radical form of social distancing
with great potential to slow the early growth of a pan-
demic, at significant economic and social costs [3, 4]. Be-
cause of this trade-off, knowing the transmissibility and
severity of a spreading pandemic are particularly critical
to effective school closure policy-making. During the 2009
H1N1 pandemic, schools closures were sporadic in the
US, triggered by diverse decision-making entities under
variable situations [5, 6] and other countries, e.g. Mexico,
implemented nationwide school closures that lasted for
about 2 weeks.
In developing school closure policies for future pan-
demics, researchers and public health officials have used
models and quantitative analyses to evaluate their effica-
cies and costs under possible pandemic scenarios [3, 7]. A
number of studies have quantified the impact of school
closures on cumulative attack rates, but have not evalu-
ated the social and economic costs of such policies [6, 8–
12]. Some of these studies demonstrate school closures
can have a significant impact on the basic reproduction. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
Araz et al. BMC Public Health 2012, 12:449 Page 2 of 11
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/449number and on the overall spread of disease [4–7, 10, 13,
14]. Other studies have estimated the direct economic cost
of influenza and school closures and their indirect impacts
on the health care system [3, 4, 15–20]. One advocates,
for example, 26 weeks of school closure in conjunction
with other policies [4]. For other modes of intervention, a
number of studies simultaneously assess epidemiological
and economic impacts using stochastic agent-based mod-
els of pandemic influenza transmission and decision-
analytic approaches [4, 12, 20–22]. While a few of these
consider one or very few school closure options among a
larger spectrum of intervention measures [4,12,23], noneTable 1 Model parameters
Sociological Parameters
Age Groups Popu
<= 5 2,019
>5<=18 4,655
>= 19 17,61
Total 24,32
% With Children <16 53.58
Average Daily Salary ($/day) 135.2
Employment Rate (%) 93
Single Parents (%) 20
Working parents missing work (%) 14
Days Work Missed 2.5 (C
Discount Rate (%) 3
Cost of Monitoring Infections ($) 100
Contact Rates (people/day)
Schools open Adults
Adults 7
Children 6
Schools closed Adults
Adults 7
Children 4
Transmission Rates (β) Adults
Min Most Likely Max
R0 ~ [1.1-1.5] Adults 0.123 0.145 0.168
Children 0.227 0.269 0.31
R0 ~ [1.5-2.1] Adults 0.178 0.201 0.234
Children 0.33 0.372 0.434
Other Influenza Parameters
Latent period (1/μ) 3 days
Infectious period (1/γ) 6 days
Case Fatality Rates (CFR) Adults
Low Severity Scenario 0.159%
High Severity Scenario 2%systematically explore the cost effectiveness and epidemio-
logical impact of a large set of school closure policies nor
assess the political, social or economic viability of such
policies for mild pandemics such as 2009 H1N1 [24].
Here, we combine a decision analytic approach with
economic and mathematical infectious disease modeling
to estimate the impact of school closures in terms of
both epidemiological and cost effectiveness. We consider
several scenarios for the transmissibility and severity of
the disease, and evaluate diverse closure and reopening
strategies covering a range of thresholds in school-aged
prevalence (SAP) and closure durations.Reference(s)
lation
,138 FedStat [29]
,105
2,731
6,974
FedStat [29]
5
Lempel et al. [3]
ouples), 5 (Single Parents)
[4,26]
Assumed
Mossong et al. [30]
Children
1
10
Children
1
2
Children Cauchemez et al. [8]
Min Most Likely Max
0.141 0.167 0.193
0.262 0.309 0.257
0.205 0.231 0.269
0.38 0.427 0.499
Gojovic et al. [12]
Children
0.01% Presanis et al. [31]
2% Chowell et al. [32]
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We evaluate a range of pandemic influenza school closure
and reopening strategies, under four different scenarios
for the transmissibility and severity of the pandemic. The
impacts of school closures on influenza attack rates are
estimated using an age-specific mass action model, i.e., all
individuals act similarly but separately from each other in
a homogenously mixed population [25]. Each school clos-
ure policy consists of a prevalence-based closure trigger
and either a prevalence-based or fixed duration re-
opening trigger. Our cost effectiveness analysis followed
the recommendations of the Panel on Cost-Effectiveness
in Health and Medicine [26], and considered a detailed
model of the societal costs of school closures as outlined
by Muenning [27].Figure 1 School closure policy pathway for high transmission
scenarios. The full tree for the 0.5% school-age prevalence closure
trigger is shown. All other closure triggers have the same decision
options as the 0.5% trigger, but are not depicted. The policy option
in blue (24-week closure triggered by 0.5% school-aged prevalence)
is one of the efficient options in the tree under both high
transmission scenarios (high and low severity).Model
We use an age-structured SEIR (Susceptible-Exposed-In-
fectious-Recovered) model [28] of pandemic influenza
transmission, based on population data for the state of
Texas from FedStat [29] (see Table 1). Infected indivi-
duals are assumed to enter a latent period (with average
duration of three days) during which they are symptom-
free, followed by an infectious period (with average dur-
ation of six days) during which they are both symptom-
atic and infectious [12] See Additional file 1 for one-way
sensitivity analyses on both latent and infectious periods.
We considered two levels of pandemic severity: rela-
tively low case fatality rates (CFR) of 0.01% for the
school age population and 0.16% for the adult popula-
tion, based on estimates for the 2009 (H1N1) pandemic
[31] and higher CFR’s (2% for both of the age groups), as
estimated for the 1918 pandemic [32].
On the other hand, estimates for the basic reproduction
number (R0) of 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza (and other
strains of pandemic flu) range between 1.1 and 2.1 [33].
Accordingly, we considered two transmission rate scenar-
ios: R0 values are sampled from age-specific triangular dis-
tributions with values ranging either from 1.1 to 1.5 (low
transmission scenario) with mean 1.3 or from 1.5 to 2.1
(high transmission scenario) with mean 1.8 (Table 1). Tri-
angular distributions were chosen because of a lack of
consensus about the distribution of reproduction numbers
for pandemic influenza; they have only three relatively
tangible parameters (minimum, maximum, and most
likely value) that are readily subjected to sensitivity ana-
lyses across likely ranges.
Mixing rates between age groups in the model were esti-
mated from the contact numbers reported in Mossong
et al. [30] (Table 1). For estimates of mixing rates during
school closures, contacts taking place in schools were
excluded, i.e. there is no compensatory contact included
in the model during school closures. Age-specifictransmission rates were then calculated based on the mix-
ing rates and R0 (see Additional file 1 and Table 1).
The mathematical formulation of the age-structured
SEIR model is given in Additional file 1. Numerical
simulations were initiated with five exposed individuals
per 1000 in the school-aged population. For each com-
bination of epidemic scenario (high/low transmission
with high/low severity) and school closure policy option,
we ran 200 simulations, each based on a random sample
of R0, i.e. sampling values from the corresponding prob-
ability distributions (Table 1).
School closure policies and the decision pathway
The possible closure triggers were a range of SAP
thresholds (prevalence in children ages 5–18), based on
the assumption that prevalence in this age group can be
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the low transmission scenario, the SAP triggers were
0.5%, 0.8%, 1.1%, 1.4%, 1.7% and 2.0%. For the high
transmission scenario, the SAP triggers included these
options plus 3%, 4%, 5% and 6%. These were constrained
by the peak prevalence predicted by the model (2.2%
and 7.9% for the school age population with a peak after
113 and 71 days in the low and high transmission sce-
narios, respectively). The ten reopening policy options
were fixed duration closures of 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 12, and
24 weeks and declines in SAP to 75%, 50% or 25% of
that measured at the time of school closure. Policies that
reopen schools based on drops in SAP depend on con-
tinual epidemiological surveillance, which can be costly
and unreliable. Our model assumes that existing surveil-
lance systems allow one-week delayed estimates of SAP,
and that additional monitoring would allow real-time
estimates of SAP, at a cost. In both cases, we assume
that the SAP estimates are exact.
Fixed duration options may be more practical than
prevalence-based re-openings, because fixed durations
allow public health agencies, schools and families to plan
in advance. However, we do not explicitly model any
additional inconvenience or costs associated with
trigger-based re-openings and the study is limited in its
ability to capture the magnitude of how rational indivi-
duals will adapt economic behavior to minimize costs.
Figure 1 illustrates a small portion of the policy tree
for the high transmission scenarios. Every school closure
policy option is represented by a unique path from the
left to the right through the tree. For example, the policy
following the top-most branches is a school closure that
(a) is triggered to close when SAP reaches 0.5%, (b)
institutes additional monitoring for changes in SAP dur-
ing the closure, and (c) is triggered to re-open when the
SAP drops to 25% of that observed at the time of the ini-
tial closure.
Cost calculation and cost effectiveness analysis
We estimated the societal costs and health outcomes for
each policy and for a base case of no school closure dur-
ing the first 180 days of the pandemic (prior to the avail-
ability of vaccines).
School closure costs
Our calculations included costs of work absenteeism
during school closure events for parents forced to stay
home with their healthy children and did not include
the hospitalization costs (see Additional file 1). We
assumed 2.5 worker days per week loss for the working
co-parents and 5 worker days per week loss for working
single parents, consistent with values used in other stud-
ies [3, 4]. Based on the 2009 Texas census data, we
assumed that 20% of working adults are single parents[29]. Worker productivity loss due to school closure ab-
senteeism was calculated according to the Human Cap-
ital Method, as in [3, 4, 34]: average salary plus benefits
times the number of days work lost.
Health outcomes
For each policy, we determined several health outcomes:
number of cases, cases averted by intervention, number
of deaths, years of life saved (YLS), total costs, and qual-
ity adjusted life-years (QALYs). According to guidelines
for program evaluation from the societal perspective [4,
26], we applied a discount rate of 3% per annum
(range = 1.5% to 6%) to both health and economic out-
comes. QALYs were calculated as one of the health out-
comes, based on the total years of life saved and the
health related quality of life (HRQL) scores for
Influenza-Like-Illnesses (ILI) of different age groups
considered in this study [26, 27, 35]. The QALY is a
measure of health outcome that assigns each period of
time a preference-based weight corresponding to the
quality of life during that period, i.e., a weight of one
corresponds to perfect health and a weight of zero cor-
responds to a health state equivalent to death [26].
We calculated incremental cost effectiveness ratios
(ICER) of each strategy (i.e., the incremental expense in-
curred for gaining the incremental health outcome when
comparing two alternative strategies) as follows:
ICER ¼ TotalCost of Strategy Bð Þ  TotalCost of Strategy Að Þ
TotalQALY Bð Þ  TotalQALY Að Þ
ð1Þ
We report the ICERs of only the “efficient” closure
policies, that is, those that have the greatest positive im-
pact for any level of investment. By convention, all other
strategies are considered dominated and were omitted
from the cost-effectiveness ratio calculations. (Results
for weakly dominated strategies are provided in Tables
A6.1-A6.4 in the Additional file 1.) We identified effi-
cient frontiers for each scenario by simultaneously con-
sidering the total cost and total QALYs of the
interventions.
Sensitivity analyses
To assess the robustness of our results to uncertainties
in critical inputs, we performed deterministic, one-way
sensitivity analyses on several critical model parameters:
the discounting rate for calculating QALY’s lost due to
mortality, fraction of working parents that miss work
during a school closure, average daily salary, case fatality
rates, percent of working parents that are single, and
overall employment rate. We varied each parameter
from half of its base value to twice its base value, and
assessed the impact on the predicted ICER’s.
Table 3 Average Cumulative Attack Rates (CAR) for school
age population and adults under the high transmission
scenarios (standard deviations in parentheses)
R0 [1.5-2.1] CAR for different durations (weeks) of
closure for each triggers (%)
Closure
Triggers
Populations 1 2 3 4 8 12 24
0.50% Students 73.96 73.71 73.36 73.04 71.21 65.28 10.10
(2.7) (3.3) (3.3) (3.5) (3.7) (3.1) (1.4)
Adults 76.90 76.76 76.62 76.46 75.36 71.14 35.51
(2.2) (2.2) (2.1) (1.9) (2.1) (3.8) (6.0)
0.80% Students 73.80 73.28 72.88 72.50 69.80 61.16 11.40
(3.5) (3.7) (3.9) (3.6) (4.6) (8.1) (1.0)
Adults 76.78 76.62 76.44 76.24 74.67 68.71 38.14
(2.1) (10) (2.0) (2.1) (2.6) (4.9) (3.4)
1.10% Students 73.58 72.95 72.37 71.85 68.31 56.65 12.90
(3.8) (3.3) (3.6) (3.2) (4.8) (7.9) (1.0)
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We evaluate the epidemiological and cost effectiveness
of a spectrum of school closure policies for mitigating
an influenza pandemic in the US under four different
pandemic scenarios: low transmission-low severity, low
transmission-high severity, high transmission-low sever-
ity, and high transmission-high severity. In the low
transmission scenarios, our model predicts a base case
(no intervention) cumulative attack rate (CAR) of 41%
for the school age population and 31% for the adult
population. Analyzing 200 simulations with different
samples of R0 for each scenario-policy combination, we
found that the attack rates tend to decrease with the
duration of the closure, and increase with the initial
prevalence trigger, that is, with the delay in closing
schools (Tables 2 and 3).
For the low transmission-low severity and low
transmission-high severity scenarios, only the lowestTable 2 Average Cumulative Attack Rates (CAR) for school
age population and adults under the low transmission
scenarios (standard deviations in parenthesis)
R0 [1.1-1.5] CAR for different durations (weeks) of
closure for each triggers (%)
Closure
Triggers
Populations 1 2 3 4 8 12 24
0.50% Students 39.12 35.63 32.02 28.35 14.28 6.15 2.39
(5.8) (6.9) (6.3) (7.3) (4.9) (1.9) (1.7)
Adults 42.45 39.30 35.88 32.30 18.52 10.52 6.88
(4.7) (5.6) (5.2) (6.4) (4.9) (2.5) (2.9)
0.80% Students 38.34 34.67 30.88 26.93 13.60 6.81 4.02
(6.2) (6.7) (7.1) (6.2) (4.2) (1.4) (1.2)
Adults 41.88 38.57 35.01 31.31 18.56 12.15 9.07
(4.8) (5.6) (5.8) (5.7) (4.2) (2.3) (2.0)
1.10% Students 37.74 33.46 29.38 25.30 13.38 8.46 6.66
(6.2) (6.4) (6.3) (5.9) (2.8) (1.3) (1.0)
Adults 41.49 37.75 34.09 30.36 19.46 15.05 13.38
(5.1) (5.3) (5.5) (5.2) (3.2) (2.8) (2.2)
1.40% Students 37.12 32.54 28.01 24.13 14.10 10.62 9.43
(6.2) (6.0) (5.9) (5.4) (2.0) (1.9) (1.8)
Adults 41.08 37.18 33.27 29.89 21.06 18.14 16.90
(5.1) (4.9) (5.0) (4.6) (2.9) (3.7) (3.2)
1.70% Students 36.69 31.63 27.32 23.63 15.58 13.27 12.40
(5.6) (5.6) (5.2) (4.5) (1.9) (2.8) (1.8)
Adults 40.82 36.70 33.09 29.96 23.26 21.45 20.80
(4.6) (4.5) (4.7) (3.9) (3.5) (4.2) (4.5)
2.00% Students 36.35 31.17 27.10 24.03 17.97 16.53 16.50
(6.1) (4.6) (3.7) (2.7) (3.3) (4.6) (4.0)
Adults 40.69 36.61 33.34 30.85 26.10 25.07 25.05
(4.8) (3.8) (3.5) (2.8) (4.6) (5.5) (5.9)
Adults 76.74 76.47 76.21 75.94 73.88 66.16 40.34
(2.2) (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.6) (4.4) (3.4)
1.40% Students 73.32 72.51 71.90 71.13 66.54 51.80 14.55
(3.1) (3.2) (3.1) 3.8) (4.3) (7.8) (9.0)
Adults 76.61 76.30 75.97 75.66 73.02 63.52 42.44
(2.0) (3.2) (2.1) (2.2) (2.2) (5.3) (2.2)
1.70% Students 73.22 72.15 71.28 70.47 64.81 47.38 15.90
(3.5) (2.0) (3.5) (4.2) (5.8) (9.5) (1.0)
Adults 76.58 76.13 75.74 75.35 72.13 61.26 44.02
(2.2) (3.5) (3.5) (2.2) (3.1) (5.4) (4.2)
2.00% Students 73.00 71.80 70.74 69.62 62.98 43.48 17.30
(3.4) (2.2) (2.0) (3.9) (5.7) (9.4) (1.5)
Adults 76.52 75.96 75.51 74.99 71.22 59.25 45.15
(2.3) (3.7) (3.9) (1.8) (3.2) (5.1) (2.5)
3% Students 72.28 70.49 68.75 67.21 56.47 31.82 21.80
(3.4) (1.9) (2.0) (3.9) (7.1) (4.8) (2.0)
Adults 53.33 52.80 52.24 51.73 47.59 39.04 49.40
(2.1) (4.2) (3.2) (2.1) (3.9) (3.4) (2.9)
4% Students 71.56 69.04 66.80 64.47 50.04 32.20 26.60
(3.4) (3.5) (2.1) (4.2) (7.6) (2.7) (2.0)
Adults 53.12 52.39 51.70 50.91 45.47 38.92 52.95
(2.2) (2.2) (4.0) (2.3) (4.0) (3.3) (4.4)
5% Students 70.87 67.63 64.68 61.61 45.40 33.34 30.40
(3.5) (3.8) (2.1) (4.7) (5.1) (1.9) (3.5)
Adults 52.94 51.97 51.04 50.03 44.13 39.98 55.90
(2.2) (2.2) (4.5) (2.5) (3.2) (3.4) (4.0)
6% Students 70.16 66.24 62.58 58.91 43.41 36.35 35.30
(3.8) (3.7) (4.1) (5.0) (3.1) (3.0) (4.0)
Adults 52.74 51.57 50.43 49.21 43.86 41.45 58.99
(2.3) (2.3) (2.7) (3.1) (3.1) (3.3) (4.0)
Figure 2 a: Cost and effectiveness comparison of school closure strategies with different closure triggers for low transmission-low CFR
scenario. Red circles indicate efficient strategies. b: Cost and effectiveness comparison of school closure strategies with different closure
triggers for low transmission-high CFR scenario. Red circles indicate efficient strategies.
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ure trigger followed by either a 12-week closure ($2.56
billion societal cost and total of 44,300 QALYs) or a 24-
week closure ($5.12 billion societal cost and 51,900
QALYs) (Figure 2a and b). For the 12-week closure pol-
icy, as the severity increases from a case fatality rate of
less than 0.2% to 2%, the incremental cost effectiveness
ratio (ICER), that is, the cost per QALY gain, decreases
from $57,700 to $4,500 and the expected number of
deaths averted rises from 4,250 to 84,188 (however, the
proportion of deaths averted increases more modestly
from 0.67 to 0.73). For a 24-week closure policy, as the
severity increases, the ICER decreases from $334,800 to
$26,400 and the expected number of deaths averted in-
crease from 4,981 to 96,702 (the proportion of deaths
averted increases from 0.79 to 0.84) (Tables 4 and 5).
For the high transmission scenarios, our model predicts
that 72% of the school age population and 52% of the adult
population will become infected. Based on an evaluation of
total costs and total QALYs for each school closure strat-
egy, three efficient strategies emerged for the high
transmission-low severity scenario (Figure 3a): (i) a 1.1%Table 4 Incremental Cost Effectiveness Ratio (ICER) of the
effective closure strategies under the low transmission-low
severity scenario
Intervention Total
Deaths
YOL
Saved
Total
QALYs
Gained
Total
Closure
Cost ($)
ICER
($/QALY)
No closure 6,340 - 0.00 -
0.5%,12w 2,090 133,612.88 44,300 2,560,372,219 57,700
0.5%,24w 1,359 156,209.94 51,900 5,120,744,439 334,800closure trigger coupled with a non-monitored prevalence-
based reopening trigger (specifically, a decrease in SAP to
25% of the original value, that is, a decrease in SAP from
1.1% to 0.275%), (ii) a 0.5% closure trigger with non-
monitored prevalence-based reopening trigger (50% de-
crease in the SAP from the closure trigger), and (iii) a 0.5%
closure trigger followed by 24 weeks of closure. Under the
first of these policies, the model predicts that schools will
close for an average of 125 days (standard deviation
3.67 days) while prevalence declines to the re-opening
threshold (Figure 4). Thus, the closure duration falls be-
tween the fixed closure options of 12 and 24 weeks. A
non-monitored (NM) policy assumes that accurate esti-
mates of SAP are made throughout the closure period with
a one-week lag. For the high transmission-high severity,
two additional efficient strategies exist; these are 3% clos-
ure trigger with non-monitored prevalence-based reopen-
ing until SAP drops to 25% of the trigger and 0.8% closure
trigger with monitoring (M) based reopening until SAP
drops to 25% of the original trigger value (See Figure 3b).
As in the low transmission scenarios, the efficient pol-
icies save more lives and have considerably lower ICERsTable 5 Incremental Cost Effectiveness Ratio (ICER) of the
effective closure strategies under the low transmission-high
severity scenario
Intervention Total
Deaths
YOL
Saved
Total
QALYs
Gained
Total
Closure
Cost ($)
ICER
($/QALY)
No closure 115,780 - - 0.00 -
0.5%,12w 31,592 3,748,812.28 566,500 2,560,372,219 4,500
0.5%,24w 19,078 4,256,198.65 663,600 5,120,744,439 26,400
Figure 3 a: Cost and effectiveness comparison of school closure strategies with different closure triggers for high transmission-low
CFR scenario. Red circles indicate efficient strategies. b: Cost and effectiveness comparison of school closure strategies with different closure
triggers for high transmission-high CFR scenario. Red circles indicate efficient strategies.
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verity scenario (Tables 6 and 7). For example, for the
1.1% SAP trigger coupled with reopening after a reduc-
tion in SAP to 25% of its original value (1.1%, NM25%),
the incremental cost per QALY gained decreases from
$56,000 to $3,100 and the number of deaths averted
with school closure increases from 4,081 to 187,307 (the
proportion of deaths averted increases from 0.27 to
0.42).
Our analyses suggest that efficient strategies depend
on the transmission rate of the strain (Tables 3, 4, 5, 6,
7). Although there is some overlap in the efficient sets
for the low and high transmission rate scenarios, there
are also notable differences. For a relatively slowly
spreading strain, an early implementation and relatively
long closure (0.5%, 12w or 0.5%, 24w) is efficient. For
more rapidly spreading strains, later closures (prevalenceFigure 4 Total influenza prevalence curves with and without school c
(blue) scenarios. Dashed lines show a typical epidemic curve under a cost
lines indicate beginning and end of each school closure.thresholds ranging from 0.5% to 3%) are viable, but re-
quire variable durations. Specifically, the 3%,NM 25%;
1.1%,NM25%; 0.8%,M25%; and 0.5%,NM50% strategies
are predicted to last 59, 125, 145, and 155 days, respect-
ively (with standard deviations of 2.50, 3.28, 3.50, and
4.12 respectively). The ICERs of the efficient strategies
are generally predicted to be lower with higher transmis-
sibility and higher severity (Tables 4, 5, 6, 7).
The World Health Organization (WHO) suggests that
health interventions be designated cost-effective if they de-
liver QALYs at a cost less than three times a nation’s
per capita GDP and very cost-effective if the cost per
QALY is less than the country’s per capita GDP [36]. To
assess the cost effectiveness of school closure policies, we
considered closure durations relative to the US per capita
GDP in 2009 (approximately $46,000 according to [36]).
Our analyses show that for the low transmission-lowlosures under low transmission (black) and high transmission
effective closure policy (based on one simulation). Vertical dotted
Table 6 Incremental Cost Effectiveness Ratio (ICER) of the
effective closure strategies under the high transmission-
low severity scenario
Intervention Total
Deaths
YOL
Saved
Total
QALYs
Gained
Total
Closure
Cost ($)
ICER
($/QALY)
No closure 15,182 - 0.00 0.00 -
1.1%,NM25% 11,101 129,858.17 67,900 3,810,077,708 56,100
0.5%,NM50% 8,667 204,696.57 83,600 4,754,976,979 60,200
0.5%,24w 7,167 251,156.96 85,200 5,120,744,439 223,800
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/449severity scenario, a 0.5% prevalence closure trigger fol-
lowed by a 12-week closure ($57,700 per QALY gain) is
the only effective and cost effective strategy (i.e., its ICER
is less than three times the US per capita GDP). For the
low transmission-high severity scenario, a 0.5% prevalence
closure trigger followed by either a 12-week closure
($4,500 per QALY gain) or 24-week closure ($26,300 per
QALY gain) meets the very cost effective threshold. Thus,
the 5%, 24w would be the preferred policy, as it is the lar-
gest one (conferring the greatest number of QALYs) with
a cost-effectiveness ratio below the willingness-to-pay
threshold.
For the high transmission-low severity scenario, a
1.1% closure trigger coupled with a non-monitored
prevalence-based reopening trigger (a decrease in SAP
to 0.275%), and a 0.5% closure trigger with non-
monitored prevalence-based reopening trigger (50% de-
crease in the SAP to 0.25%) are cost effective but not
very cost effective, with costs of $56,000 per QALY gain
and $60,200 per QALY gain, respectively. The latter of
the two is larger (higher total QALY’s gained), and thus
would be the preferred choice. Finally, for the high
transmission-high severity scenario, all five efficient
strategies meet the very cost effective threshold, with the
0.5% SAP trigger, 24-week closure being the preferred
program. Our cost estimates are comparable to pub-
lished values (Table 8). For the low transmission-low se-
verity scenario, influenza is predicted to cost the State of
Texas 0.023–0.5% of its GDP.Table 7 Incremental Cost Effectiveness Ratio (ICER) of the
effective closure strategies under the high transmission-
high severity scenario
Intervention Total
Deaths
YOL
Saved
Total
QALYs
Gained
Total
Closure
Cost ($)
ICER
($/QALY)
No closure 444,157 - 0 0.00 -
3%,NM25% 255,762 6,577,339.87 599,300 1,798,356,678 3,000
1.1%,NM25% 256,850 6,524,695.19 1,239,800 3,810,077,708 3,100
0.8%,M25% 255,517 6,587,498.52 1,411,800 4,419,690,141 3,500
0.5%,NM50% 250,337 6,660,573.77 1,497,300 4,754,976,979 3,900
0.5%,24w 249,206 6,889,044.94 1,529,600 5,120,744,439 11,300For both high and low transmission pandemics, the pre-
dicted ICER values varied considerably with the percent-
age of working adults who will miss work due to
influenza, average daily salary, and case fatality rate (CFR).
For example, we illustrate this with a tornado diagram for
the preferred strategy under the high transmission-high
severity pandemic scenario (Figure 5). Increases in any of
the parameters, except the CFR, lead to increases in the
ICER of the school closure policies. Conversely, decreases
in pandemic severity (CFR) lead to increases in ICER of
the closure policy. None of these parameter perturbations
cause the policy to lose its very cost effective designation,
that is, the ICER remains well below the willingness-to-
pay threshold of $46,000. The parameters influence the
ICER values similarly for the cost effective policies under
the other three pandemic influenza scenarios (Figures
A4.1-A4.3 in Additional file 1). While none of the pertur-
bations cause the preferred policies rise above the cost ef-
fectiveness willingness-to-pay threshold, some extreme
parameter perturbations are predicted to move policies
from very cost effective to cost effective (by increasing the
ICER) or, vice versa, from cost effective to very cost effect-
ive (by reducing the ICER).
Discussion and conclusions
School closure interventions, in general social distancing
interventions and population behavior changes, will lead
to a delayed impact of the overall pandemic by reducing
the peak of the current pandemic wave and overall epi-
demic size. However, it is expected that the temporarily
spared susceptible population during the first wave can
be affected during subsequent second or third pandemic
waves. It is also important to note that it may take num-
ber of weeks before reliable estimates of pandemic sever-
ity could be inferred and this could impact the
effectiveness of policy decisions on whether school clo-
sures should be triggered. This was the case during the
2009 A/H1N1 pandemic in Mexico; when the Mexican
government decided to close schools across the country
based on the available information, there was no reliable
estimate of the case fatality ratio.
According to our model, school closures can signifi-
cantly reduce the total number of influenza cases, but the
epidemiological impact and societal costs of a school clos-
ure critically depend on the timing and duration of the
closure. In the early days of a pandemic, there is typically
considerable uncertainty about its transmission rate (or
R0) and its severity (or CFR). Policy makers face two inter-
related decisions: (1) whether or not to implement a
school closure policy; and (2) if so, which one. The answer
to the first question depends on the predicted effective-
ness and cost effectiveness of the effective policy options.
We find that relatively few closure policies are efficient
under the low transmissibility scenarios, while several are
Table 8 Comparison to published analyses
Cost of Influenza Cost of Closure Closure Duration Population $ Amount
Sadique et al. - 0.2-1% GDP 12 weeks England 0.2-1.2 Billion Sterlin
Lempel et al. - 0.1-0.3% GDP 4 weeks US 10-47 Billion $
Smith et al. 3.3-4.3% GDP - 4 weeks UK 85.8 -97.6Billion Sterling
Brouwers et al. 2-3% GDP - - Sweden 2.5 Billion SEK
Sander et al. - - 26 weeks US 2720 $/person
Araz et al. 0.023-0.5% GDP 1-24 weeks Texas 0.2-5.12 Billion $
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/449efficient under the high transmissibility scenarios. The an-
swer to the second question depends on both the trans-
mission rate and severity of the pandemic. Slower
spreading pandemics call for early triggers and relatively
long duration closures (12 weeks and 24 weeks), regard-
less of severity; and more rapidly spreading pandemics
allow for higher triggers (e.g. 1.1% and 3%) coupled with
moderate durations (averages of 125 days and 59 days, re-
spectively), depending on the severity of the strain (see
Additional file 1 for timing of the triggers for both cases).
Although we assumed that the SAP estimates are exact in
the model and single step errors, e.g. a policy intending to
close school at a SAP of 0.8% actually closing school at
0.5% or 1.1%, do not make large differences in CARs, it is
worth mentioning that these kind of errors can generate
dramatic switches in the effectiveness of policy implemen-
tation, e.g. a switch from a cost effective strategy to a
dominated or weakly dominated strategy (e.g. see low
transmission, low CFR scenario in the Additional file 1
Table A6.1).
The policy options included fixed duration closures
and re-opening triggers based on decreases in school-
aged disease prevalence, both with and withoutFigure 5 Tornado diagram comparing the relative impact of input va
trigger, 24-week) under the High transmission-High severity scenario
parameter as it ranges from 50% of its base value to two times of its baseadditional surveillance to improve real-time prevalence
estimates. Our model assumed that, in the absence of
monitoring, decision-makers receive accurate estimates
of prevalence with a one-week delay, and monitoring
simply removes the delay. Although the direct cost of
monitoring is assumed to be low, most of the efficient
policies are either fixed duration or have non-monitored
reopening triggers. This suggests that slightly lower
reopening thresholds than those considered may provide
a better balance between costs of closure and health out-
come. Similarly, the efficiency of several trigger-based
re-opening policies may indicate that there are better
fixed durations than the values considered.
In summary, we have integrated a mathematical model
of influenza transmission dynamics into a cost-
effectiveness analytic framework for evaluating a wide
range of school closure and reopening policies with re-
spect to their societal costs and health impacts. The pre-
sented rigorous approach of this paper can be adapted
to evaluate and compare a variety of non-pharmaceutical
, vaccine, and antiviral policy options for influenza. We
have found that the transmission rate and case fatality
rate of a spreading pandemic can dramatically impactriables on the ICER for the preferred closure policy (0.5% SAP
. The width of the bars indicates the uncertainty associated with each
value, as given in Additional file 1.
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/12/449whether or not a school closure policy is efficient and
cost effective. Although not surprising, this highlights
the importance of obtaining early and reliable estimates
of pandemic severity to public health decision-making.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Appendix 1–6 [37]
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